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steady state or to the high steady state. This implies that a regime switching rational expectation
equilibrium, where the economy switches between paths converging to the two diﬀerent steady
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1 Introduction
In recent years we have observed a revival of interest of macroeconomics in ﬁscal policy.
For example, Feldstein (2009) discusses the recent rise of ﬁscal activism and Taylor
(2011) assesses the size of the ﬁscal multipliers associated with the US stimulus packages
of the period 2001-2009. While ﬁscal multipliers measure the impact of discretionary
ﬁscal policy on output levels, another related strand of the literature studies instead the
stabilization role of ﬁscal policy. Among those see Mckay and Reis (2016) who revisit
the role of macroeconomic stabilizers using modern macrodynamic models.1 Fiscal rules
have also emerged as a key response to the ﬁscal legacy of the ﬁnancial crisis. In
particular the balanced-budget rule has been advocated, by policy institutions such as
the IMF and the OECD,2 in order to ensure ﬁscal responsibility and sustainability.
In this paper we discuss the stabilization role of ﬁscal policy under a balanced-
budget rule in the presence of incompressible public expenditures. More concretely, we
consider a non-monetary general equilibrium dynamic model where, each period, the
government must raise a ﬁxed minimum amount of tax revenues in order to ﬁnance
unavoidable (incompressible) public expenditures, which should remain constant along
business cycles.3 This implies a countercyclical income tax, which tends to magnify
economic ﬂuctuations by creating incentives for spending in good times, and may lead
to the emergence of local indeterminacy, generating an additional source of instability
associated with the occurrence of local self fulﬁlling volatile expectations. Moreover,
it creates steady state multiplicity and, thereby, may lead to the emergence of global
indeterminacy as well.4 We then discuss whether, in this context of a balanced-budget
rule and incompressible public expenditures, the introduction of a suﬃciently procycli-
cal share of additional variable government expenditures in output is able to stabilize,
both locally and globally, endogenous business cycle ﬂuctuations driven by volatile self
fulﬁlling expectations.
Conventional wisdom states that procyclical/progressive tax rates (or equivalently,
under a balanced budget, a procyclical share of government expenditures in output)
have stabilizing eﬀects, which help smooth out business cycle ﬂuctuations due either to
exogenous shocks on fundamentals or to volatile expectations (sunspots).5 Friedman
1They consider a model with a unique determinate equilibrium and focus on the impact of stabilizers
on the volatility of endogenous variables, due to exogenous shocks in fundamentals.
2See Schaechter (2012) and Fall et al. (2015).
3They reﬂect the views of society on the appropriate size of expenditures associated with the basic
functions of government.
4Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) were the ﬁrst to analize the implications for local indetermi-
nacy of a balanced-budget rule, where the government ﬁnances a ﬁxed amount of expenditures using
distortionary income taxation. However they did not adress global (in)stability issues.
5See, for example, Kletzer (2006) and Moldovan (2010) for the case with exogenous shocks to funda-
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(1948) was one of the ﬁrst to advocate a progressive tax system, which places primary
reliance on the income tax, in order to attain both long run goals and short run sta-
bility.6 Here, we show that in the presence of incompressible public expenditures, the
stabilization ability of ﬁscal policy is lost.
But is the presence of incompressible public expenditures an empirically relevant
issue? The answer is a resounding yes. They correspond to expenditures associated with
the basic functions of government (public safety, defense and general public services)
and have been remarkably constant for many developed countries, for very long time
horizons.
Figure 1: minimum government spending (blue) vs total government spending per
capita in the U.S. (in thousands of dollars)
In ﬁgure 1 we present the evolution of these public expenditures and total public
mentals and Guo and Lansing (1998), Dromel and Pintus (2008) for the case of shocks to expectations.
6Friedman (1948) also defended that government spending should be stable and determined by
the needs of society, which already suggests incompressible public expenditures. Moreover in his
proposal the budget should on average be balanced and the government should not issue interest-
bearing securities to the public. Note that in our non monetary setup this implies that the government
should balance its budget at all periods.
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Figure 2: Minimum government spending (blue) vs total government spending per
capita in others countries (in thousands of euros)
expenditures for the USA, in per capita terms, from 1959 to 2015 in constant prices of
2015. We can see that while total per capita government spending increased steadily
in time, the level of per capita expenditures associated with the basic functions of
government did not change much over such a long period, which implies that they do
not follow business cycles. To conﬁrm this visual inspection we HP-ﬁltered the data
removing the trend and regressed the cyclical component of each type of government
spending on the cyclical component of output. The results obtained (see Appendix
9.1) show unequivocally that while per capita expenditures associated with the basic
functions of government are constant, i.e. they are not correlated with output, the dif-
ference between total government expenditures and incompressible public expenditures
is signiﬁcantly correlated with income, following therefore the business cycle.
Note that the per capita level of incompressible public expenditures may vary
across countries, reﬂecting the views of each society on how much should be spent on
the basic functions of government.7 However, we expect them to be relatively stable in
7Nevertheless, there is no great variation among OECD countries with respect to these basic gov-
ernment expenditures. A developed country needs security and public administration, and it is diﬃcult
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time for each country, regardless of the time evolution of total government spending.
This is indeed the pattern we ﬁnd across several European countries from 2002 to 2014,
a particularly turbulent period in macroeconomic terms. See ﬁgure 2.
Until now the literature considered either fully ﬂexible government expenditures
or a totally constant public spending. In this paper, in line with empirical evidence, we
address simultaneously the existence of a variable government spending component and
one ﬁxed, incompressible, component. We ﬁnd that, under a balanced-budget rule, when
the government needs to ﬁnance incompressible public expenditures, two steady states
emerge, one being always a saddle. Focusing on local dynamics is therefore not enough
for stabilization purposes. Indeed we ﬁnd that, although a suﬃciently procyclical share
of the variable government spending component in output is able to stabilize locally the
indeterminate steady state, it will not eliminate steady state multiplicity.
Our results contrast with those obtained in frameworks where government spending
is fully ﬂexible and where there exists a (suﬃciently) procyclical share of government
expenditures in output. Under a balanced budget, this is equivalent to a (suﬃciently)
procyclical tax rate for all levels of output, which ensures the existence of a unique
steady state and of its local determinacy (saddle).8 In our case, due to the existence of
a countercyclical share of the incompressible government spending component in output,
there will always be values of output for which the tax rate is countercyclical. Hence, the
tax rate cannot be globally procyclical (or acyclical), which leads to multiple steady
states and global indeterminacy, as the economy may switch from one equilibrium
path to the other. This means that under a balanced-budget rule, in the presence
of incompressible public expenditures, ﬁscal policy is no longer able to insulate the
economy from belief driven ﬂuctuations. In this context the management of expectations
is crucial to guarantee that the economy remains on the path converging to the high
output equilibrium.
However, if expectations can not be controlled, the existence of multiple equilibria,
associated with diﬀerent expectations about the state of the economy, implies that a
regime switching rational expectation equilibrium easily arises. In this equilibrium the
economy switches between paths converging to the two diﬀerent steady states, accord-
ing to a sunspot variable. This implies that in our framework expectations are able to
inﬂuence the long run outcomes of the economy, and not just the choice of the conver-
gence path to one steady state. Therefore, in addition to small ﬂuctuations around a
to compress this kind of State spending. In contrast, with respect to government social expenditures,
the diﬀerences between countries are signiﬁcantly bigger.
8See for example Guo and Lansing (1998), where a suﬃciently progressive tax rate is able to
eliminate indeterminacy caused by increasing returns to scale. Note that, in macro models, progressive
and procyclical tax rates are similar in terms of the stability properties of the equilibrium.
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locally indeterminate steady state, we are able to account for large ﬂuctuations gener-
ated by a regime switching sunspot process. Indeed our model is able to generate large
and sudden expansions and contractions in response to expectation shocks. We con-
clude that the widespread existence of incompressible public expenditures in developed
countries, not only implies the failure of traditional ﬁscal stabilization policies, but may
also be responsible for sharp and sudden recessions.
Our paper is related to several recent strands of the literature: global indetermi-
nacy, multiplicity of equilibria and regime switching sunspot equilibria. Benhabib et
al. (2001a, b) were the ﬁrst to show that under monetary Taylor rules the targeted-
inﬂation steady state coexists with a second deﬂation steady state, and to construct
equilibria in which the economy transitions from one steady state to the other. More
recent contributions are Aruoba et al. (2017) and Mertens and Ravn (2014), where
a Markov-switching sunspot shock can move the economy between the targeted inﬂa-
tion regime and the deﬂation regime.9 In this paper, we provide a novel mechanism
of multiple equilibria and nonfundamental ﬂuctuations associated now with ﬁscal pol-
icy.10 We show that ﬁscal rules, in particular the existence of a balanced-budget rule
and incompressible public expenditures, may also be responsible for the emergence of
a similar conﬁguration, where the economy may ﬁnd itself trapped in the low output
steady state, which coexists with the high output steady state, and where a regime
switching equilibrium easily emerges.
The idea that a economy may switch between alternative equilibrium paths that
converge to diﬀerent steady states has recently been receiving more and more attention
in diﬀerent setups. Like us, Kaplan and Menzio (2016) and Benhabib et al. (2018)
consider non monetary models and construct regime switching sunspots equilibria. The
mechanisms responsible for equilibria multiplicity and sunspots ﬂuctuations are however
totally diﬀerent.11 Our mechanism emphasizes the role of ﬁscal policy and has the merits
of being simple and plausible.12
9See also Piazza (2016) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2017).
10Note that, although in earlier papers (Benhabib and Farmer (1994), Farmer and Guo (1994) and
Christiano and Harrison (1999)) indeterminacy, equilibria multiplicity and nonfundamental shocks
emerged because of increasing returns to scale in production, in our paper we do not need increasing
returns, incompressible expenditures are suﬃcient.
11Kaplan and Menzio (2016) propose a model where multiplicity is obtained from diﬀerences in the
shopping behavior of employed and unemployed buyers and where economic ﬂuctuations can be caused
by self-fulﬁlling changes in the agents' expectations about unemployment. Benhabib et al. (2018) show
that an adverse selection problem for ﬁnancial intermediaries generates multiple steady states and both
local and global indeterminacy, and can give rise to regime switching sunspots equilibria.
12Note that the OECD in a recent economic policy paper (see Fall et al. (2015)) advocates the
combined use of a balanced budget rule and an expenditure rule, whose existence is at the basis of our
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the
model considered and obtain the perfect foresight equilibria. In section 3, we study
steady state existence and multiplicity. Section 4 is devoted to the study of local dy-
namics, while section 5 examines global dynamics. In section 6 we consider more general
functional forms and ﬁscal rules and show that our results are robust. In section 7 we
develop an augmented version of the model in which agent's expectations about future
economic activity (output) follow a Markov switching process and provide a numerical
illustration of the eﬀects of expectation shocks. Finally, in section 8 we provide some
concluding remarks. Mathematical proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The model
We consider an inﬁnite-horizon Ramsey model where public spending has two com-
ponents: a ﬁxed incompressible component, and a variable component which the gov-
ernment uses to stabilize the economy against belief driven cycles. To keep the budget
balanced, the government issues distortionary income taxes. Households are inﬁnitely-
lived and have a logarithmic utility function in consumption and a perfectly elastic
labor supply. Firms have access to a Cobb-Douglas technology, which may exhibit in-
creasing returns to scale, and use labor and capital to produce a single good which is
consumed or invested. This section describes such an economy.
2.1 Government
Total government spending, Gt, includes one incompressible component, G ≥ 0, and
a variable component, i.e., we assume that
Gt = G+ g(yt) (1)
where g(yt) ≥ 0 is the time-varying component of government spending, which is an
exogenously given function of aggregate income, yt, and which the government uses for
stabilization purposes.
Distortionary (proportional) income taxation ﬁnances wasteful public expenditures
Gt and the government budget is balanced at each point in time, i.e. we have that:
Gt = (1− zt)yt (2)
where zt ∈ (0, 1] denotes the ﬁscal wedge,13 and (1−zt) is the endogenously determined
total income tax rate, which is obviously identical to the share of government spending
mechanism.
13The ﬁscal wedge is the ratio between income net of taxes and gross income.
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in output. We could have considered the existence of a stock of debt at the time of entry
of the balanced budget rule, D > 0 (which obviously remained constant thereafter)
and the corresponding interest payments. In Appendix 9.3 we show that our results
would either not change or would be reinforced with the consideration of public debt.
Therefore, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that D = 0.
Using (1) and (2) we obtain
zt = z(yt) ≡ 1−G
yt
− τ(yt) (3)
where τ(yt)≡g(yt)yt is the share of the variable component of government expenditures in
output. From (3) we observe that the total tax rate on income, 1−z(yt), has two distinct
components. The ﬁrst component, G/yt, which is due to the existence of incompressible
public expenditures, is countercyclical, i.e. it decreases when output increases. The
second component, τ(yt), represents the ﬁscal rule which the government uses with
stabilization purposes. We assume it is a monotonic continuous function of aggregate
income, with either τ ′(y) < 0 for all y ∈ (0,+∞), or τ ′(y) > 0 for all y ∈ (0,+∞) , or
τ ′(y) = 0 for all y ∈ (0,+∞). We also assume that τ(y) is convex or not too concave.14
We denote by φ(yt) ≡ τ ′(yt)ytτ(yt) ∈ < the elasticity of τ(yt). Accordingly, this ﬁscal rule
may be procyclical (φ(yt) > 0), countercyclical (φ(yt) < 0), or acyclical (φ(yt) = 0).
We further denote by εz(yt) ≡ z′(yt)ytz(yt) the elasticity of z(yt). Using (3) we obtain
εz(yt) =
G− φ(yt)τ(yt)yt
yt −G− τ(yt)yt
> −1. (4)
The last inequality is needed to guarantee that after tax income, z(yt)yt, is increasing
in income. It follows that the cyclicality of the total tax rate, (1− z(yt)), measured by
its elasticity ε1−z(yt) =
−z′(yt)yt
1−z(yt)) is given by:
ε1−z(yt) =
φ(yt)τ(yt)− G¯yt
G
yt
+ τ(yt)
. (5)
As the denominator is positive, if G > 0 two conﬁgurations occur: either φ(yt) ≤ 0 and
the tax rate is countercyclical, or φ(yt) > 0 and the tax rate is procyclical for y high
enough and countercyclical otherwise. Therefore, we can not ensure the existence of a
procyclical (or acyclical) tax rate for all values of y when G > 0.
14Although this assumption is not needed for most of our results (see Appendix 9.2.) it simpliﬁes
considerably the exposition.
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2.2 Households' behavior
We consider an economy populated by a large number of identical inﬁnitely-lived
agents. We assume without loss of generality that the total population is constant and
normalized to one. At each period an agent has a perfectly elastic labor supply lt with
lt ∈ [0, l¯] and l¯ > 1 his time endowment. She derives utility from consumption, ct, and
disutility from labor, lt, according to the instantaneous utility function U(ct, lt):
U(ct, lt) = ln(ct)− lt
B
(6)
where B > 0 is a scaling parameter.
Households, when choosing ct and lt, face the following budget constraint:
k˙t + ct = z(yt)[wtlt + rtkt]− δkt, (7)
where kt is the capital stock at time t, wt the wage rate, rt the rental rate of capital
and δ > 0 the depreciation rate of capital.
The intertemporal maximization problem of the representative household is given
below:
max
ct,kt,lt
∫ +∞
t=0
e−ρtU (ct, lt) dt
s.t. (7)
(8)
where ρ > 0 is the discount factor. Note that households take as given the ﬁscal wedge,
z(yt), when maximizing utility.
Denoting by λ(t) the shadow price of capital, the current-value Hamiltonian writes:
U(ct, lt) + λt [z(yt)[wtlt + rtkt]− δkt − ct] (9)
The ﬁrst-order conditions are:
c−1t = λt (10)
1 = Bλtz(yt)wt (11)
λ˙t
λt
= −[z(yt)rt − (ρ+ δ)] (12)
Any solution needs also to satisfy the transversality condition:
lim
t→+∞
e−ρtλtkt = 0 (13)
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2.3 The production structure
We consider a competitive environment in which a continuum of measure one of iden-
tical ﬁrms produce a single good yt using capital kt and labor lt. The ﬁrms' technology
displays constant returns to scale at the private level according to a Cobb-Douglas
speciﬁcation yt = F (kt, lt, k¯t, l¯t) = e(k¯t, l¯t)k
s
t l
1−s
t with e(k¯t, l¯t) ≡ (k¯st l¯1−st )γ, γ ≥ 0, a
learning-by-doing externality, k¯t, l¯t being respectively the average-wide stock of capital
and hours worked, which are taken as given by individual ﬁrms. Since at the aggregate
level we have k¯t = kt and l¯t = lt, at equilibrium the technology displays increasing
returns to scale when γ > 0, i.e. yt = k
α
t l
β
t with α = s(1 + γ), β = (1− s)(1 + γ).
From the proﬁt maximization of the ﬁrm, we obtain the real wage rate wt and the
real rental rate of capital rt as:
rt = se(k¯tl¯t)
(
kt
lt
)s−1
=
syt
kt
≡ r(kt, yt) (14)
wt = (1− s)e(k¯t, l¯t)
(
kt
lt
)s
=
(1− s)yt
lt
≡ w(lt, yt) (15)
Hence, proﬁts are zero and yt = wtlt + rtkt.
In what follows, we assume that the capital share of output, s, is small, i.e., s < 0.5,
as usually done in the literature. Moreover, in order to avoid endogenous growth, we
consider not too strong productive externalities, i.e. we assume that γ < 1−s
s
, so
that α < 1. Together, these two assumptions imply that β > max {α, γ} . All these
assumptions are summarized below in Assumption 1 and we consider them satisﬁed in
the rest of the paper.
Assumption 1. s < 0.5 and 0 ≤ γ< 1−s
s
so that α < 1 and β > max {α, γ}.
2.4 Intertemporal equilibrium
In this section, we deﬁne the intertemporal perfect foresight equilibrium of this econ-
omy. From the aggregate production function we can write lt = l(kt, yt) ≡ y1/βt k−α/βt
which implies that, using (15), we can express the wage as a function of kt and l(kt, yt)
so that:
wt = (1− s) kα/βt y(β−1)/βt ≡ w(kt, yt) (16)
Substituting (10) and (16) in (11), we solve this equation with respect to ct and obtain:
ct = B(1− s)z(yt)kα/βt y(β−1)/βt ≡ c(kt, yt) (17)
Below, we provide the elasticities of the latter expression with respect to y and k:
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εcy =
[β(1+εz(yt)−1]
β
εck =
α
β
(18)
with εz(yt) given by (4).
Diﬀerentiating equation (17) with respect to time, we obtain:
·
ct
ct
=
α
β
·
kt
kt
+
β(1 + εz(yt))− 1
β
y˙t
yt
. (19)
Substituting (10) and (14) in (12) we have
·
ct
ct
=
sz(yt)yt
kt
− (ρ+ δ). (20)
Equating now (19) and (20) and rearranging terms we ﬁnally obtain:
y˙t
yt
=
sβz(yt)yt − (ρ+ δ)βkt − αk˙t
kt [β(1 + εz(yt))− 1] (21)
with z(yt) > 0 , and εz(yt) given respectively by (3) and (4). Note that if β(1+εz(yt))−
1 = 0, at some point in time t we say that we have a singularity, and equation (21) is not
properly deﬁned. We will discuss later the implications of the existence of singularities
on the study of the dynamics of the model.
Substituting now (17) in the households' budget constraint (7), we obtain the law
of motion of the capital stock:
k˙t = z(yt)yt − δkt − c(kt, yt) (22)
with c(kt, yt) given in (17).
Deﬁnition 1. An intertemporal perfect foresight equilibrium is a path {kt, yt}t≥0
satisfying equations (21)-(22) for a given k0 > 0 and the transversality condition (13),
with z(yt) ∈ (0, 1], given in (3), εz(yt) given in (4) and c(kt, yt) given in (17).
Note that k is a predetermined variable, its value being given from the past, while
y is non predetermined. Hence, it is a priori possible that there may exist several
diﬀerent values of y0 compatible with perfect foresight equilibria trajectories for the
same k0, as it occurs in the presence of (local or global) indeterminacy. In this case
there are multiple self-fulﬁlling expectations-driven equilibria.
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3 Steady state existence and multiplicity
A steady state is a positive 4-tuple (k, l, c, y), with y ∈ (y, y¯), satisfying:
y = kαlβ (23)
cl = B(1− s)z(y)y (24)
sz(y)y = (ρ+ δ)k (25)
c = z(y)y − δk (26)
with z(y) ≡ 1− G
y
− τ(y) > 0 (27)
Solving this system of equations we obtain:
k = sz(y)y
(ρ+δ)
c = [ρ+(1−s)δ]z(y)y
(ρ+δ)
l =
[
[B(1−s)(ρ+δ)]
[ρ+(1−s)δ]
]
(z(y)y)α y−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡H(y)
=
(
s
(ρ+ δ)
)−α(
(1− s)(ρ+ δ)B
ρ+ (1− s)δ)
)−β
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡H¯
with z(y) ≡ 1− G
y
− τ(y) > 0
(28)
Steady state existence and multiplicity are determined by the solutions ofH(y) = H¯.
Note that we restrict y ∈ (y, y¯) with y > 0 and y¯ ∈ (y,+∞) to ensure that z(y) > 0.
See Appendix 9.2. We use the scaling parameter B > 0 to ensure the existence of a
normalized steady state (NSS), y = 1. Hence,
Proposition 1. The solution (knss, lnss, cnss, 1) of system (28) is a NSS if and only
if B = B∗ with:
B∗ =
[ρ+(1−s)δ]
(ρ+δ)(
s
(ρ+δ)
)α
β
(1− s)z(1)
(29)
z(1) = 1−G− τ(1) > 0 (30)
Steady sate multiplicity requires that H(y) is a non monotonic function, crossing at
least twice the value H¯. To study steady state multiplicity, we must then characterize
the sign of εH(y) ≡ H′(y)yH(y) . From (28) we have that
εH(y) = α(1 + εz(y))− 1 (31)
where εz(y) is given in (4). In Appendix 9.2 we show that:
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Proposition 2. Under Assumption 1 and Proposition 1, when G > 0, H(y) > 0 is
always single-peaked in y ∈ (y, y¯) and there are exactly two steady states. Moreover,
when G = 0, H(y) > 0 is single peaked and there are exactly two steady states if and
only if φ(y) ≡ τ ′(y)y/τ(y) < 0 for all y. In contrast, when G = 0 and φ(y) ≥ 0 for all
y, the steady state is unique.
Proof. See Appendix 9.2.
Note that if εz(y) ≤ 0 for all y ∈ (y, y¯) then, given that α < 1 under Assumption
1, from (31) we can see that the function H(y) is always decreasing for all y ∈ (y, y¯),
so there can only be one steady state. Using (4) we see that this happens when G = 0
and φ(y) ≥ 0, ensuring that the total tax rate is procyclical (see (5)).
In contrast, as proved in Appendix 9.2, the existence of any countercyclical com-
ponent in the steady state tax rate, 1− z(y) = G
y
+ τ(y), is suﬃcient (regardless of its
degree of countercyclicality) for the appearance of two steady states, as in this case the
function H(y) > 0 is always single-peaked. Therefore:
Corollary 1. Under the conditions of Proposition 2, a strictly positive G is suﬃcient
for steady state multiplicity. Denoting the low output steady state by yl and the high
output steady state by yh, we have (1 + εz(yl)) >
1
α
and (1 + εz(yh)) <
1
α
.
Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 tell us that, if the government needs to ﬁnance a
ﬁxed minimum amount of spending (G > 0), steady state multiplicity can not be
eliminated even if φ(y) > 0, although that would be possible if G = 0. Note that,
when G > 0, the elasticity of the tax rate at the low output steady state is always
negative, i.e., the tax rate at the low output steady state is countercyclical even when
τ(yt) is procyclical.
15 This implies that, even when φ(y) is suﬃciently positive, we can
not ensure the existence of a procyclical (or acyclical) tax rate for all y ∈ (y, y¯) when
G > 0, i.e., at equilibrium, the tax rate cannot be made globally procyclical (acyclical).
Therefore, in the presence of incompressible public expenditures, the function εH(y)
always changes sign for y ∈ (y, y¯), so that, in contrast to the case of G = 0, a procyclical
τ(yt) is not able to eliminate steady state multiplicity.
4 Local Analysis
We now characterize the local stability properties of our dynamic system around a
steady state. We start by linearizing system (21)-(22) around a steady state solution y
15From Corollary 1, when G > 0 two steady states emerge and at the low output steady state we
have εz(yl) >
1−α
α . Using (4) and (5) we conclude that at the low output steady state ε(1−z)(yl) <
α−1
α
z(y)
1−z(y) < 0, i.e. the elasticity of the tax rate at the low output steady state is always negative.
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and k, obtaining: (
dy˙(t)
dk˙(t)
)
= J
(
dy(t)
dk(t)
)
. (32)
The local stability properties of the model are determined by the eigenvalues of the
Jacobian matrix J (given in Appendix 9.3) or, equivalently, by its trace, Tr, and de-
terminant, D, which correspond respectively to the product and sum of the two roots
(eigenvalues) of the associated characteristic polynomial Q(λ) = λ2−Trλ+Det with:
Tr = ρ+
(ρ+ δ) [1− (1 + εz)(α + β)]
{β(1 + εz)− 1} (33)
D =
(ρ+ δ)2 [1− α(1 + εz)]
s {β(1 + εz)− 1} (34)
where εz ≡ εz(y). Necessary and suﬃcient conditions to obtain local indeterminacy (a
sink) are D > 0 and Tr < 0, while the necessary and suﬃcient condition to get local
saddle-path stability is D < 0. Finally, the steady state is locally a source if and only
if D > 0 and Tr > 0.
Proposition 3. Under Assumption 1 and Propositions 1 and 2, the high output steady
state is locally indeterminate (a sink) if and only if (1 + εz(yh)) ∈ ( 1β , 1α) and is locally
determinate (a saddle) if and only if (1 + εz(yh)) <
1
β
. Furthermore, the low output
steady state is always locally determinate (a saddle).
Proof. Note that the numerator of the determinant at the high output steady state yh
is positive as the condition 1+εz(yh) <
1
α
holds. Local indeterminacy requires therefore
a positive denominator of both trace and determinant which implies 1 + εz(yh) <
1
β
.
Since α < β under Assumption 1, the latter condition also leads to a negative trace, so
that the necessary and suﬃcient conditions to get local indeterminacy around the high
output steady state are 1 + εz(1) ∈ ( 1β , 1α). The rest of the proposition follows since at
the low output steady state (1 + εz(yl)) >
1
α
> 1
β
, so that the determinant is always
negative.
Our local indeterminacy mechanism is once again related with the labor market
"wrong slopes" condition.16 Noting that the slope of the MPL (marginal productivity
of labor) curve is −(1− β), while the slope of the inverse labor supply curve is −βεz,17
16Other works where this condition is required are for example Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (1997),
Benhabib and Farmer (1994) or Dufourt et al. (2008).
17At the general equilibrium level where l = l and k = k we can rewrite the MPL schedule (15) as
d logwt = αd log kt−(1−β)d log lt. In what concerns the inverse of the labor supply schedule from (11),
considering a constant λ, z(y) given by (3) with yt = k
α
t l
β
t , we obtain d logwt = −βεzd log lt−αεz log kt.
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it is easy to see that our indeterminacy condition β(1 + εz(yh)) > 1, requires (i) ei-
ther a negatively sloped inverse labor supply schedule (εz > 0) steeper than the (also
negatively sloped) MPL curve (β < 1), or (ii) a positively sloped MPL curve (β > 1),
steeper than the (also positively sloped) inverse labor supply schedule (εz < 0), or (iii)
a positively sloped MPL curve and a negatively sloped inverse labor supply schedule.18
4.1 Stabilizing locally
We consider now Proposition 1 satisﬁed, so that the normalized steady state exists.
Denoting φ ≡ φ(1) = τ ′(1)
τ(1)
, we choose a parameterization such that the NSS is locally
indeterminate in the absence of any cyclical ﬁscal policy rule (φ = 0).19 In Proposition
4 below we state the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for this to happen:
Proposition 4. Under Assumption 1 and Propositions 1 and 3, consider that the
government does not pursue any cyclical ﬁscal policy (φ = 0). Then the NSS is locally
indeterminate if and only if (1− β) (1− τ(1)) < G < (1− α) (1− τ(1)).
Proof. Note that, since εz(1) =
G¯−φτ(1)
1−G¯−τ(1) , when φ = 0, from Proposition 3, we obtain
immediately the condition above.
As α = (1+γ)s and β = (1+γ)(1−s), we conclude that in the absence of production
externalities, γ = 0, indeterminacy requires a suﬃciently positive G. Remark that the
presence of increasing returns is not needed for any of our main results. See Propositions
2 and 4. However, its consideration allows us to have a more general framework,
encompassing several works who considered increasing returns to scale, but not G, and
that are here obtained as particular cases of our model for G = 0.20
Assume now that the government wants to insulate the economy from local belief
driven ﬂuctuations around the NSS. This is done by eliminating local indeterminacy.
In Proposition 5 below we state how the government can ensure local determinacy of
the NSS using ﬁscal policy:21
Proposition 5. Under Assumption 1 and Propositions 1 and 3, assume that
(1− β) (1− τ(1)) < G < (1− α) (1− τ(1)) . Then, local indeterminacy of the NSS
18Note that in the absence of productive externalities γ = 0, and with φ = 0, so that the share of
variable government expenditures in output is constant, our indeterminacy condition collapses into the
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe's (1997) indeterminacy condition s < Gy < 1− s, whereas in the absence of
government we recover Benhabib and Farmer's (1994) indeterminacy condition α < 1 < β.
19Under Proposition 3 this implies that the NSS is the high output steady-state.
20See for example Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and Guo and Lansing (1998).
21 Remark that φ is exogenously made to vary by considering continuos changes in τ ′(1). Hence,
existence of the normalized steady state is persistent and always ensured since B∗ only depends on
τ(1) and does not depend on τ ′(1). See Proposition 1.
14
is eliminated, and local saddle path stability of the normalized steady state is achieved
with a suﬃciently procyclical share of variable government spending in output such that
φ > G−(1−β)(1−τ(1))
τ(1)β
> 0.
Proof. From Proposition 3, it is easy to see that the government can eliminate local
indeterminacy, obtaining saddle path stability of the NSS, by increasing φ, so that
εz(1) =
G¯−φτ(1)
1−G¯−τ(1) decreases, satisfying the inequality (1 + εz(1)) <
1
β
, that we can
rewrite as φ > G¯−(1−β)(1−τ(1))
τ(1)β
> 0.
We conclude that if φ is suﬃciently positive, the NSS becomes a saddle, which elim-
inates the existence of local sunspot ﬂuctuations. However, this policy is not able to
globally stabilize the economy against endogenous ﬂuctuations if G > 0. Indeed, we
know from our previous analysis, that with G > 0, another steady state with a lower
level of output also exists. Both steady states are saddles and therefore locally determi-
nate. Nevertheless, as will be shown in the next section there is global indeterminacy.
Indeed, in the presence of multiple steady states, ensuring that all of them are locally
determinate does not eliminate global indeterminacy and sunspots. To address these
issues we must analyze the global dynamics of the model.22
5 Global Analysis
5.1 Phase diagram
Substituting (22) in (21) our dynamic system (21)-(22) can be rewritten in the fol-
lowing way: [
k˙t
y˙t
]
=
[
f1(kt, yt)
(1+γ)f2(kt,yt)
f3(yt)
yt
kt
]
(35)
where the vector in the RHS is the vector ﬁeld of system (35) and:
f1(kt, yt) ≡ z(yt)yt − δkt − c(kt, yt)
f2(kt, yt) ≡ s [c(kt, yt)− sz(yt)yt]− [ρ(1− s) + δ(1− 2s)]kt
f3(yt) ≡ β(1 + εz(yt))− 1
with c(kt, yt), z(yt) and εz(yt) given respectively by (17), (3) and (4).
22Guo and Lansing (1998) show that, in an economy with no incompressible expenditures (G = 0),
a policy equivalent to a suﬃciently positive φ is able to stabilize the economy, if (local) indeterminacy
is caused by suﬃciently high productive externalities. Here we show that if local indeterminacy is
caused by the the existence of incompressible government spending, then such policy will not be able
to eliminate global indeterminacy, even if it eliminates local indeterminacy.
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In order to analyze global dynamics, in ﬁgures 3 and 4, we depict in the space
(y, k) the k and the y nullclines and the arrows that represent the vector ﬁeld. The
k−nullcline satisﬁes f1(kt, yt) = 0, and the y−nullcline satisﬁes f2(k, y) = 0. Of course
these two schedules cross twice, respectively at the low and high output steady states.
In Appendix 9.4 we show that along the k−nullcline we have dk/dy > 0, and that
the slope of the y−nullcline will change sign at most two times. Moreover, for k = 0,
i.e., at the intersection between the y−nullcline and the line k = 0, the slope of the
y−nullcline is positive and above unity.23 As both k and y increase, the slope of the
y−nullcline decreases, and the nullcline reaches a maximum when its slope becomes
zero. As y further increases its slope becomes negative, reaching −∞, so that the
y−nullcline becomes vertical. In Appendix 9.4 we show that for reasonable values of
the parameters we obtain a correspondence, i.e., after becoming vertical the nullcline
bends inwards, as depicted in ﬁgures 3 and 4. It is also easy to show24 that when k = 0
the y−nullcline is located on the right of the k−nullcline, as represented in ﬁgures 3
and 4.
In Appendix 9.4 we also show that above the k−nullcline we have k˙ < 0, i.e.,
above (below) the k˙ = 0 line the vertical arrows that represent the vector ﬁeld of k˙t
point downwards (upwards). Before determining the directions of the horizontal arrows
that represent the vector ﬁeld of y˙t it is important to note that our model exhibits a
singularity for y = ys such that f3(y
s) = β(1 + εz(y
s)) − 1 = 0. In the space (y, k),
y = ys deﬁnes a vertical line. This line partitions the space (y, k) into two subsets
of regular points: one set, which we denote by Ω+, where f3(y) > 0, i.e., where the
necessary condition for indeterminacy is satisﬁed, and another, denoted by Ω−, where
this condition is not satisﬁed, i.e. f3(y) < 0. Of course, on diﬀerent sides of the vertical
line y = ys horizontal arrows point in opposite directions. The full determination of
the direction of the horizontal arrows, depicted in Figures 3 and 4, is also provided in
Appendix 9.4.
In the following, we will restrict our analysis to equilibrium regular paths that
converge to a steady state.25
5.2 Global Dynamics when the NSS is a sink
We will start by addressing the situation where the NSS is a sink, that is depicted
23It is equal to 1/α.
24See Appendix 9.4..
25 We deﬁne equilibrium regular paths as solutions of (35) that do not collide with y = ys and
verify the initial and transversality conditions. For an analysis of singular dynamics paths see Brito et
al. (2017).
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in ﬁgure 3. As explained above the NSS is the high output steady-state, which coex-
ists with a lower output steady state which is a saddle. Since at both steady states
f3(y) = β(1 + εz(y)) − 1 > 0, they are both located on the same side of the singu-
larity so that ys > 1. All deterministic trajectories starting on the left of the saddle
path diverge to either k = 0 or to y = y and cannot be equilibrium paths. Oth-
erwise, all other deterministic trajectories converge to the higher output sink steady
state, with the exception of those starting precisely on the stable arm of the saddle,
which converge to the lower output steady state. This means that, for the same initial
given value of the predetermined variable, the capital stock, there are several diﬀerent
equilibrium trajectories that converge to diﬀerent steady states,26 i.e., we have global
indeterminacy.27 The equilibrium trajectory obtained depends on the value of the non
predetermined variable chosen, which is expected output. Also, since the NSS is a sink,
it is locally indeterminate and there exist inﬁnitely many stochastic endogenous ﬂuctu-
ations (sunspots), driven by expectations, arbitrarily close to it. We can therefore state
the following:
Proposition 6. Under Assumption 1 and Propositions 1 and 3, when (1 + εz(1)) ∈
( 1
β
, 1
α
) there are exactly two steady states: the NSS, which is the high output steady and
a sink, coexists with the low output steady state which is a saddle. In this case there
is global indeterminacy. Furthermore the NSS is locally indeterminate and there exist
local stochastic endogenous ﬂuctuations (sunspots).
5.3 Global Dynamics with two saddles
Now, if the government decides to stabilize locally the NSS, it can, as described
above, make it saddle-stable by increasing φ so that f3(1) = β(1 + εz(1)) − 1 < 0.
Both steady states are now locally saddle-stable, but in the low-output steady state
f3(yl) = β(1 + εz(yl)) − 1 > 0. This means that we have yl < ys < 1 so that the
situation depicted in ﬁgure 4 emerges. Remark that stabilizing locally implies moving
the position of the singularity line from the right to the left of the NSS.
However, although in this case the share of the variable government spending com-
ponent in output is procyclical (φ > 0), and local indeterminacy and sunspots no longer
26Note however, that since all equilibrium trajectories, with the exception of the one that converges
to the low output steady state, end up at the high output steady state, the likelihood of reaching the
low output steady state is low.
27See Raurich (2000) for a deﬁnition and a clear cut discussion about global indeterminacy issues.
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Figure 3: Sink-saddle conﬁguration
exist, the total tax rate, as noted before, is not procyclical (or acyclical) for all y and the
problem of global indeterminacy remains. Again, for a given initial value of the capital
stock, the model admits equilibria that converge either to the lower steady state or to
the NSS.28 These equilibria diﬀer with respect to the agents' expectations about future
output. This implies that expectations about future output, determine the long-run
outcomes of the economy, i.e. we also have global indeterminacy.
Proposition 7. Under Assumption 1 and Propositions 1 and 3, when 1 + εz(1) <
1
β
< 1
α
there are exactly two steady states: the NSS, which is the high output steady and
a saddle, coexists with the low output steady state which is a saddle. In this case there
exist two distinct saddle paths and hence there is global indeterminacy.
We conclude that in our model, and in contrast to previous results, a procyclical
share in output of the variable government spending component , i.e. a procyclical τ(y),
is not able to insulate the economy from belief driven ﬂuctuations. Furthermore, since
these ﬂuctuations are due to the existence of global (and not local) indeterminacy, the
current indeterminacy mechanism is able to generate (or account for) sharp ﬂuctuations
in output as, if agents' expectations are revised downwards, the economy is displaced
from the upper to the lower stable arm, making the economy converge to the lower
28For all other values of y we obtain divergent trajectories.
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Figure 4: Saddle-saddle conﬁguration
output steady state.29 Hence, a ﬁscal policy that locally stabilizes, eliminating small
ﬂuctuations, is not able to prevent (big) ﬂuctuations caused by changes in agents'
expectations. In this context the management of expectations is crucial to guarantee
that the economy remains on the right path, avoiding sharp belief driven ﬂuctuations.
It is clear from the above discussion that steady state multiplicity is responsible
for these results. Also, as explained above, in our model steady state multiplicity is
pervasive, due to the existence of a positive ﬁxed amount of minimum government ex-
penditures. It follows, that when the government is not able to manage private agents'
expectations, abandoning the view that government expenditures, even in recessions,
can not fall below a ﬁxed minimum level, is the only way to avoid the perils of sta-
bilization. Indeed, making government spending fully ﬂexible (and procyclical), thus
eliminating G, is the only way to obtain simultaneously saddle path stability and steady
state uniqueness, and hence global determinacy, fully restoring the ability to stabilize
of a suﬃciently procyclical government spending/tax rate policy.
However, if the government is not able to eliminate G or to manage expecta-
tions we obtain multiple equilibrium trajectories associated with diﬀerent expectations
about future output. Note however that in each equilibrium agent's expectations are
correct. Indeed, when agents' conﬁdence falls and the economy lands on the low output
29Furthermore, such major crisis is potentielly long lasting if the revision in agents' expectations is
persistent.
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trajectory, the output that materializes is the one expected by the agents. Similarly,
when conﬁdence is restored and agents are optimistic, the economy switches to the high
output trajectory. Again the output that materializes is the one expected by agents.
6 Robustness
In this section, we assess through numerical exercises the robustness of our conclusions
by relaxing the assumption of an identical tax rate for labor and capital income and by
considering a more general functional form for utility.
6.1 Considering diﬀerent tax rates rules for labor and capital
income
We maintain the assumption that there is a ﬁxed minimum level of government
expenditures, G > 0, but we now assume that, in order to stabilize the economy, the
government controls the cyclicality of g(y) = τ(y)y using two diﬀerent tools: a policy
rule for the labor income tax, τl(y), and a policy rule for the capital income tax, τk(y),
such that τ(y) = sτk(y) + (1− s)τl(y). These two instruments may diﬀer in level and in
their response to aggregate output. For numerical purposes, we consider a functional
form for the tax rates à la Lloyd-Braga et al. (2008):
τj(y) = µjy
φj , j = k, l (36)
where the elasticity of the tax rate is denoted by φj, and the level of the tax rate is
governed by the parameter µj. The disposable income of households is therefore given
now by zl(y)wl + zk(y)rk with
zj(y) = 1− τj(y)− G
y
, j = k, l. (37)
and we still have Gt = [1− z(yt)]yt where z(yt) = [1− Gy − (1− s)µlyφlt − sµkyφkt ].
It is obvious that our conclusions on the existence and the multiplicity of steady
states remain, since they rely only on the presence of G in the after-tax labor and
capital income. We focus therefore on the local and global dynamic properties of the
extended model.
We consider calibrated values of the parameters for a quarterly frequency. In
particular, we set (ρ, δ, s) = (0.01, 0.025, 0.3). The ﬁrst two values are widely used in
quarterly calibrations, while the value considered for the share of capital income in
national income is standard in the macroeconomic literature. In addition, we set the
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Parameters ρ δ s G¯ µl µk γ
Values 0.01 0.025 0.3 0.1 0.35 0.23 0.38
Table 1: Calibration of main parameters
learning-by-doing externality at γ = 0.38.30 With these values for the parameters, in
the absence of incompressible government expenditures, G¯ = 0, or any taxation policy,
φl = φk = 0, the NSS would be locally determinate (a saddle). Since we want to start
from a situation where the government desires to stabilize the economy around the NSS,
we set G¯ = 0.1 in order to guarantee that the NSS is a sink.31 Regarding the tax rates
on labor and capital income, we set (µk, µl) = (0.23, 0.35) which can be considered mild
values according to the estimates provided by Trabandt and Uhlig (2011). Note that
this implies a labor tax rate of 45% at the NSS and capital tax rate of 33% also at the
NSS, in line with empirical estimates. The parameter values considered are summarized
in Table 1.
In the following numerical exercises diﬀerent sets of values for φl and φk were chosen
to allow for diﬀerent choices of ﬁscal policy. We observe that the stabilizing power of
the two tools is dramatically diﬀerent. While the labor income tax rate can be used to
successfully stabilize locally the economy, the same is not true for the capital income
tax rate. Indeed, a value of φl > 0.231, fully prevents the economy from stationary
expectation-driven ﬂuctuations around the NSS, regardless of the value chosen for φk.
Such conclusions conﬁrm and complement the contribution of Guo (1999) that only a
progressive labor income tax is stabilizing.
We now study global dynamics by choosing values of φl and φk corresponding
to either a locally destabilizing or stabilizing ﬁscal policy. In particular, in order to
signiﬁcantly deviate from the baseline model with a unique income tax rate, we consider
pairs of values of φl and φk with opposite signs. Figure 5 illustrates a case where the
government sets φl = −0.5 and φk = 1, which leads to a sink-saddle conﬁguration.
The ﬁrst conclusion is that this ﬁgure is quite similar to ﬁgure 3, which supports the
robustness of our results. The solid lines represent the k−nullcline and the y−nullcline,
respectively in red and black. As in ﬁgure 3, the upper steady state (NSS) is locally
indeterminate and therefore, for a given k0, there are an inﬁnite number of initial values
30This value is signiﬁcantly below the benchmark value of γ = 0.5 considered in Benhabib and
Farmer (1994), and quite close to the upper limits of the obtained estimation intervals in Basu and
Fernald (1997) and Burnside et al. (1995).
31This value is in accordance with our own computations, which report country shares of incom-
pressible government expenditures in GDP, G¯/y, between 0.05 and 0.12.
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Figure 5: Sink-saddle conﬁguration. φl = −0.5, φk = 1.
of output y that converge to this steady state. The dotted lines depict this kind of
trajectories. We can observe that these equilibrium paths converge in a non-monotonic
way, which implies therefore an endogenous propagation mechanism. We also plot two
trajectories, in dashed lines, surrounding the nonlinear saddle-path that converges to
the lower steady state. In contrast, this equilibrium path, for a given k0, admits a unique
initial value for y for which the economy converges to the lower steady state. However,
as in the case with just a unique income tax rate we have global indeterminacy. For
initial values of k there are diﬀerent values of y compatible with convergence to the
lower or to higher steady state.
In ﬁgure 6, we illustrate the case where the government sets φl = 0.5 and φk = −1.
In this case, with a suﬃciently procyclical labor income tax rate, and as in ﬁgure 4,
both steady states are locally determinate (saddle-path stable). As above, the nullclines
are represented by the solid lines,32 while the location of the two nonlinear saddle-paths
is given by dashed lines. We also plots the singularity that occurs at y = 0.768. One
easily observes that, as in the case with just a unique income tax rate depicted in ﬁgure
4, for a given initial value of the capital stock k0, there are two initial values of output
y, each located on a diﬀerent equilibrium trajectory on diﬀerent sides of the singularity,
32In this ﬁgure we do not fully represent the RHS of the y-nullcline, which, as in the previous ﬁgures
is backward-bending.
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Figure 6: Saddle-saddle conﬁguration. φl = 0.5, φk = −1.
i.e. we have global indeterminacy. It follows that, also in this case one may construct
deterministic cycles and/or regime switching sunspot equilibria between the two saddle
paths, which validates our previous results.
6.2 Considering more general preferences
In this section we introduce a more general functional form for the instantaneous
utility function U(ct, lt):
U(ct, lt) =
c
(1−σ)
t
(1− σ) −
l
(1+χ)
t
B(1 + χ)
(38)
where σ 6= 1 is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) and χ > 0
is the inverse of the elasticity of labor supply. Through numerical exercises, we examine
the robustness of our conclusions on steady state multiplicity and indeterminacy for
empirically accepted values of σ and χ. Using our baseline calibration with an identical
(procyclical) income tax rate for labor and capital income,33 our simulation results show
that, keeping χ = 0, we still obtain steady state multiplicity (again two steady states)
33We considered τ(y) = µyφ with µ = 0.3 and φ = 0.33. The values considered for the other
parameters are the ones in Table 1.
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for any σ ∈ (0.4, 1.18).34 Note that this interval, according with recent works by Vissing-
Jorgensen and Attanasio (2003), and Gruber (2013), includes all the empirically relevant
values for σ.35 Similarly, considering σ = 1, we still obtain two steady states for values
of χ ∈ (0, 0.6).36 Moreover, regarding local stability, we ﬁnd that for σ ∈ (0.4, 1.18)
and χ ∈ (0, 66), both steady states are saddle-path stable. We conclude therefore that
our previous results are robust.
7 Expectations Shocks
In this section, we discuss and illustrate the eﬀects of expectations shocks. We
start by providing a version of the model in which agents' expectations about long-
run output follow a simple two state Markov switching process, allowing yt to jump
between trajectories. We then use the augmented model to illustrate the eﬀect of shocks
to the agents' expectations about long-run output. Finally, we discuss the economic
mechanism responsible for the emergence of global indeterminacy and regime switching
sunspots.
Note that, in order to explore the quantitative eﬀects of expectations shocks, in
this section we use a generalized version of our baseline model, with diﬀerent capital
and labor income tax rates and where the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is no
longer equal to unity.
7.1 Modelling Expectation Shocks
In this section we follow Kaplan and Menzio (2016),37 borrowing their deﬁnition of a
Markov switching rational expectation equilibrium. We introduce a sunspots variable,
St, which takes two values, 0 or 1. We assume that St = 1 is associated with the
belief that the economy is in a trajectory converging to the high output steady state
(conditional on remaining in the same optimistic state), whereas St = 0 is associated
with the belief that the economy is on a trajectory converging to the low output steady
state (conditional on remaining in the same pessimistic state). Agents' expectations
switch from optimistic to pessimistic with probability p, i.e., the probability that St
34Note however the presence of a transcritical bifurcation around σ = 0.46.
35Both Vissing-Jorgensen and Attanasio (2003) and Gruber (2013) report estimates for σ between
0.5 and 1. See also Hansen and Singleton (1982) and Bansal and Yarow (2004) and Hansen et al.
(2007). Note that some earlier papers used to ﬁnd much higher values for σ ∈ (1.25, 5). See for
example Kocherlakota (1996) and Campbell (1999).
36Note that Rogerson and Wallenius (2009), besides the consideration of an inﬁnitely elastic labor
supply, recommend using values for χ around 0.333. Accordingly, we considered χ ∈ (0, 0.6).
37See also Benhabib et al. (2018) and Kamihigashi (2017).
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changes from unity to zero in a short interval is p. In this case output falls by D1,0(k, y).
Similarly the agents' expectations switch from pessimistic to optimistic with probability
q, in which case output increases by D0,1(k, y).
In the optimistic state, the evolution of the economy is described by the two
equations below:
y˙t
yt
= − α
[β(1 + εzl(yt))− 1]
k˙t
kt
+ β
szl(yt)yt − (ρ+ δ)kt
kt [β(1 + εzl(yt))− 1]
+ pD1,0(kt, yt) (39)
k˙t = [(1− s)zl(yt) + szk(yt)]yt − δkt − c(kt, yt) (40)
where c(kt, yt) = [B(1− s)zl(yt)kα/βt y(β−1)/βt ] 1σ . The term in the LHS of (39) represents
the change in output conditional on the economy remaining in the optimistic state.
The ﬁrst two terms on the RHS correspond to the generalization of the RHS of (21)
for the case where zl(yt) 6= zk(yt) and σ 6= 1, while the last term is the probability that
the economy switches to the pessimistic state, p, times the resulting change in output
conditional on the economy switching states, D1,0(k, y). The second equation describes
the evolution of capital. The term in the RHS corresponds to the generalization of the
RHS of (22) for the case where zl(yt) 6= zk(yt) and σ 6= 1.
Similarly, in the pessimistic state the behavior of the economy is described by the
following two equations:
y˙t
yt
= − α
[β(1 + εzl(yt))− 1]
k˙t
kt
+ β
szl(yt)yt − (ρ+ δ)kt
kt [β(1 + εzl(yt))− 1]
+ qD0,1(kt, yt) (41)
k˙t = [(1− s)zl(yt) + szk(yt)]yt − δkt − c(kt, yt) (42)
where, as above, c(kt, yt) = [B(1 − s)zl(yt)kα/βt y(β−1)/βt ] 1σ . The term in the LHS of
(41) represents the change in output conditional on the economy remaining in the
pessimistic state. The ﬁrst two terms on the RHS correspond, as in the optimistic case,
to the generalization of the RHS of (21) for the case where zl(yt) 6= zk(yt) and σ 6= 1,
while the last term is the probability that the economy switches to the optimistic state,
q, times the resulting change in output conditional on the economy switching states,
D0,1(k, y). The second equation describes the evolution of capital, which is the same as
in the optimistic state.
Since expectations must be rational we need to impose the following conditions.
First, when the economy switches from the optimistic to the pessimistic state, the value
of output must land on ySl , where y
S
l denotes the stable manifold associated with the
low-output steady state. This guarantees that, if the economy then remains in the
pessimistic state forever, it will converge to the low output steady state. Second, when
the economy switches from the pessimistic to the optimistic state, the value of output
must fall on ySh the stable manifold associated with the high-output steady state if
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this steady state is a saddle, or its basin of attraction if it is a sink. This guarantees
that, if the economy then remains in the optimistic state forever, it will converge to the
high output steady state. Finally, if the initial state of the economy is optimistic, the
initial value of output must be on the stable manifold associated with the high-output
steady state or in its basin of attraction, while if the initial state of the economy is
pessimistic, the initial value of output must be on the stable manifold associated with
the low output steady state.
Let S denote a history of realizations of St and tn(S) the n
th time at which the
state of the process switches in history S. Then, following Kaplan and Menzio (2016)
we deﬁne:
Deﬁnition 2. A Markov switching rational expectation equilibrium is a history-
dependent path {kt(S), yt(S)} such that, for every S, the following conditions are sat-
isﬁed: (i) For all t ∈ [tn, tn+1) with Stn = 1, {kt, yt} satisﬁes (39) and (40). (ii) For
all t ∈ [tn, tn+1) with Stn = 0, {kt, yt} satisﬁes (41) and (42). (iii) For any k and any
y ∈ ySh (k), y+D1,0(k, y) ∈ ySl (k). For any k and any y ∈ ySl (k), y+D0,1(k, y) ∈ ySh (k).
(iv) y0 ∈ ySh (k0) if S0 = 1, and y0 ∈ ySl (k0) if S0 = 0.
Note that when p = q = 0 the solution of (39) and (40)) is any equilibrium path
which converges to the high output steady state, depicted in ﬁgure 5, if this steady state
is a sink, or the saddle path towards the high output steady state depicted in ﬁgure 6
if this steady state is a saddle. Similarly, when p = q = 0 the solution of (41) and (42)
is the saddle path towards the low output steady state, depicted in ﬁgures 5 and 6. By
continuity these functions exist for small values of p and q and solve respectively (39)
and (40), and (41) and (42). In Appendix 9.5 we discuss the approximation used.
7.2 Illustrating the eﬀects of an expectation shock
We now illustrate the behavior of the model economy under global indeterminacy and
sunspot shocks. We consider the case where the two steady states are both saddles, so
that yl < ys < 1, and where the economy starts in the optimistic state, being therefore
described by equations (39) and (40). However, our economy can be hit by a severe
and persistent crisis triggered by a sudden loss in conﬁdence, which brings it to the
lower equilibrium trajectory. The next ﬁgure depicts such a numerical exercise where
we assume p = 0.02 and q = 0.04. These values imply that the model economy will
remain in the optimistic state with probability 0.666. The values chosen for some of
the other parameters are given in Table 1. Moreover, we considered φl = 0.25 and
φk = −0.95, so that we have two saddles, and set σ = 0.59 to ensure that the diﬀerence
of the two steady states is empirically plausible. Indeed with this calibration we obtain
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yl = 0.85, i.e., a loss in conﬁdence implies a 15 percent decrease in long run output, a
value which represents half of the fall in output observed during the Great Depression
in the USA. See Ohanian (2001). Moreover, according to Ball (2014), the long-term
eﬀects of the global recession of 2008-2009 on output in 23 countries were quite large.38
He ﬁnds that the average long term output loss for the 23 countries, weighted by the
sizes of their economies, was 8.4%, and reports losses over 30% in Greece, Hungary, and
Ireland. Also half of the countries considered registered long term output losses above
9.57%.39
Note also that with this calibration the values obtained for the labor and capital
income tax rates at the lower steady state are quite close to the ones corresponding to
the high output steady-state. Indeed the labor tax rate at the low output steady state
is 0.4527 (vs. 0.45 at the high output steady state) while the capital income tax rate
at the low output steady state is 0.3721 (vs. 0.33 at the high output steady state).
This is reassuring as it means that our simulation results are not driven by empirically
implausible increases in taxation.
In ﬁgure 7 the economy starts in the optimistic state and remains there for 32
quarters, reaching the high output steady-state. Then, in period 33, as St drops from
1 to 0, agents' expectations about future output become pessimistic and the economy
jumps to the trajectory converging to the low output steady-state. We observe an im-
mediate drop in output and investment. However, as expected, the fall in consumption
is slower,40 which is a nice feature of our model, although more persistent. Remark that
in the Great Recession, we observed a similar pattern. Indeed, consumption was still
below pre-recession levels 8 quarters after the oﬃcial end of the recession. See Petev
et al. (2011). Interestingly, according to these authors this behavior was explained
by expectations, i.e. by "a decline in consumer conﬁdence which may have reduced
spending through accumulation of precautionary savings (or reduction of debt) as well
as deferment of spending, most notably on durables."41 The model economy then stays
in recession for 24 periods, reaching the low output steady state. Remark that when
38Ball measures these eﬀects by comparing current estimates of potential output from the OECD
and IMF to the path that potential output was following in 2007, according to estimates at the time.
Note that this concept is closer to our diﬀerence between two long term solutions than actual output
losses.
39For the United States he reports a loss of potential output of 5.3%, somewhat smaller than in most
countries.
40This behaviour of consumption is due to the choice of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
41They remark that a year and a half after the end of the recession, consumer conﬁdence was still
below pre-recession levels.
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Figure 7: Simulation of a path-switching sunspot process, φl = 0.25, φk = −0.95,
σ = 0.59.
falling from the upper to the lower saddle-path output always overshoots,42 so that
along the lower saddle path output (and investment) increases. Then, as St jumps
from 0 to 1 in period 57, agents become optimistic again, and the economy jumps to
the saddle path converging to the high output steady state. The same pattern repeats
itself one more time, with jumping events at period 76 (recession) and 86 (boom). As
all these movements are generated by switches between trajectories converging to quite
diﬀerent long run output levels, the ups and downs we observe are considerably larger
than ﬂuctuations around one single trajectory, like the ones generated by exogenous
productivity shocks or local sunspots in the case of an indeterminate steady state.
7.3 The economic mechanism behind regime switching
sunspots
Below, we describe the economic mechanism behind the emergence of regime switching
sunspots in the case with two saddles. For the sake of simplicity we revert back to the
42This is due to the relative slopes of the lower and the upper saddle-paths: at the switching point
both are negatively slopped.
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case with identical labor and capital income tax rates. Note ﬁrst that in the absence
of distortions, i.e., without productive externalities (γ = 0) and without government
(G = 0 and φ(y) = 0), we recover the results of the classical Ramsey model: the steady
state is unique and saddle-stable. Neither local nor global indeterminacy are possible, so
that endogenous ﬂuctuations are ruled out. Furthermore, consumption is a decreasing
function of output.43 With suﬃciently strong productive externalities, but no taxes, the
steady state is still unique but indeterminate (a sink). Local sunspots ﬂuctuations are
therefore possible. Also in this case consumption is increasing in income.44 When we
consider taxation (G > 0 and φ(y) 6= 0), and even without externalities, we always have
steady state multiplicity.45 A low output steady state, where [α(1 + εz(yl))− 1] > 0, ap-
pears and coexists with a high output steady state where [α(1 + εz(yl))− 1] < 0.When
the two steady states are saddles, we have εz(yh) <
1−β
β
< 1−α
α
, while at the low output
steady state εz(yl) >
1−α
α
> 1−β
β
. This means that the function [β(1 + εz(y))− 1] = ∂Ct∂yt
(see (18)) is positive for values of y < ys, is zero at y = ys and becomes negative when
y > ys. We conclude, that for a given value of capital, consumption is a single peaked
function of income. Therefore, for a given value of capital, there are two values of
output on diﬀerent sides of the singularity, y1 < ys and y2 > ys that sustain the same
level of consumption, i.e., from (17) we have z(y1)y
(β−1)/β
1 = z(y2)y
(β−1)/β
2 .
Consider now the following. Departing from a situation where expectations are
optimistic, so that the economy is on the saddle path converging to the high output
steady state, we observe a sudden drop in conﬁdence. Agents become pessimistic about
the future of the economy and expect a simultaneous fall in consumption, capital and
output. As along the saddle path converging to the high output steady state we have
a negative relation between capital and income, it is easy to see that for these expec-
tations to be self-fulﬁlling, the economy has to switch to the saddle path on the left of
the singularity. Indeed, for the same value of capital, the economy jumps from point
A to point B, where consumption is identical, and starts moving downwards along the
new saddle path, in the direction of the low output steady state. We observe therefore
a simultaneous decrease in output and capital. As consumption increases with capi-
tal and, on this side of the singularity, increases with output, consumption also falls
43Note that with an inﬁnitely elastic labor supply the income eﬀect is constant and equal to 1
and there is no substitution eﬀect. Indeed using (10) and (11) we obtain ct = Bwt. Substituting now
(16) in the previous expression we have ct = c(kt, yt) ≡ B(1 − s)kα/βt y(β−1)/βt so that equilibrium
consumption is decreasing in y and increasing in k since β = (1− s) < 1.
44As before ∂Ct∂yt =
(β−1)
β y
− 1β
t , but now β = (1− s)(1 + γ) > 1.
45The function εH(y) = [α(1 + εz(y))− 1] , which without any form of countercyclical taxation is
always negative, now changes sign once. See Proposition 2.
29
Figure 8: Regime-Switching Expectations.From point A to B: pessimistic expectation.
From point C to D: optimistic expectation
unambiguously. Expectations are therefore self-fulﬁlling. Consider now the situation
where agents, while on the path converging to the low output steady state, become
optimistic, expecting an increase in output, capital and consumption. Again, in order
for the expectations to be self fulﬁlling, the economy must jump to the saddle path
converging to the high output steady state. For the same level of capital the econ-
omy jumps from point C to point D, where consumption is identical. The economy
then starts moving upwards along the (negatively sloped) saddle path on the right of
the singularity, converging to the high output steady state. Moreover, as along the
high output saddle path, capital increases and income decreases, since on this side of
the singularity consumption decreases with y, we obtain an unambiguous increase in
consumption. Therefore again expectations are self fulﬁlling.
8 Concluding Comments
The balanced-budget rule has been advocated in order to ensure ﬁscal discipline, sus-
tainability and government solvency, avoiding the perils associated with explosive public
debt trajectories and sovereign default. In this paper, we show that under a balanced-
budget rule conventional stabilization policy recommendations are no longer valid in
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the presence of incompressible public expenditures, such as public safety, defense and
general public services. Without such expenditures, a suﬃciently procyclical share of
government spending in output (or suﬃciently procyclical tax rates) is able to guar-
antee both local and global uniqueness of equilibrium, preventing expectation-driven
ﬂuctuations. In contrast, the need to raise a ﬁxed amount of tax revenues in order
to ﬁnance incompressible public expenditures, always generates global indeterminacy,
associated with the emergence of two steady states. We show that the low activity
steady state is always saddle-path stable while the high activity one may be either a
sink (locally indeterminate) or a saddle (locally determinate). A government, willing
to eliminate local expectation-driven ﬂuctuations around the high steady state, can do
so by setting a suﬃciently procyclical share of the variable government spending in
output. But, as global indeterminacy persists, the economy remains exposed to large
and persistent ﬂuctuations based on a regime-switching sunspots process.
In this context, a government faces several trade-oﬀs. The ﬁrst is a "welfare vs.
stabilization" trade-oﬀ. The only way to completely eradicate global indeterminacy
and regime-switching ﬂuctuations is to eliminate the incompressible property of expen-
ditures associated with the basic functions of a State. In particular, these expenditures
will have to follow the business cycle: increasing in a boom and decreasing in a re-
cession. Of course, this option has severe political and social costs, especially in a
recession, being therefore diﬃcult to implement. The second trade-oﬀ has to do with
the magnitude of the ﬂuctuations. A government who wishes to maintain incompress-
ible expenditures may chose to disregard and to endure "small" ﬂuctuations around
the high output (sink) steady state. Note that in this context regime-switching ﬂuctu-
ations are unlikely since this steady state acts as a global attractor. However, in the
simulations performed, the existing multiple trajectories converging to the high output
steady state were non-monotonic and of long duration, which suggests non-negligible
ﬂuctuation costs. Finally, a potential solution to simultaneously keep the incompress-
ible expenditures while minimizing expectation-driven ﬂuctuations is to successfully
convince economic agents that the economy will remain in the high activity state. This
requires a careful expectations' management which is uncertain and very diﬃcult to
implement.
We conclude that under a balanced-budget rule the existence of incompressible
expenditures can severely undermine the stabilization role of ﬁscal policy. A government
may therefore feel tempted to abandon the ﬁscal discipline of a balanced-budget rule.
The emission of public debt, breaking the link between incompressible expenditures and
countercyclical tax rates, could attenuate some of the implications of incompressible
public spending. However, issuing more government bonds may not be an option for
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those countries that have reached extremely high levels of public debt. Moreover, recent
works (see Aires et al. (2018) and Lorenzoni and Werning (2018)) have shown that debt
itself may be a source of equilibria multiplicity triggered by volatile expectations, where
a good and a bad equilibria coexist. As this suggests that abandoning the balanced-
budget rule will not solve the multiplicity problem and associated ﬂuctuations, we
conclude that governments must seriously consider whether they can aﬀord to maintain
incompressible public expenditures.
9 Appendix
9.1 Regressing the cyclical components of public spending on
cyclical output
The cyclical components of all variables were obtained using the Hodrik-Prescott (HP)
ﬁlter and are expressed in percentage deviations from trend. Below we present the re-
sults obtained when regressing by OLS the cyclical component of the diﬀerence between
total per capita U.S. government spending in constant prices of 2015 and incompress-
ible U.S. public expenditures in constant prices of 2015, (Gt − Gt)∗, on the cyclical
component of per capita U.S. output in constant prices of 2015, y∗t .
(Gt −Gt)∗ = α1 + α2y∗t + et
Estimate S.E. T-stat p.value
α1 -0.001 0.019 -0.075 0.94
α2 -0.078 0.027 -2.915 0.01
n = 56, R2 = 0.136
We can see that the cyclical diﬀerence between total government spending and
incompressible public expenditures is signiﬁcantly correlated with cyclical income.
A similar regression was also performed for the cyclical component of incompressible
public expenditures, G
∗
t .
G
∗
t = β1 + β2y
∗
t + ut
Estimate S.E. T-stat p.value
β1 -0.001 0.011 -0.060 0.95
β2 0.026 0.016 1.630 0.11
n = 56, R2 = 0.047
32
In this case we conclude the opposite. The correlation between G
∗
t and y
∗
t is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, i.e. the hypothesis that G
∗
t is constant is not rejected
by the data at the usual levels of signiﬁcance.
9.2 Steady State Existence and Multiplicity
Existence and multiplicity are determined by the solutions of H(y) = H¯. Assume
ﬁrst that G¯ > 0. Consider that z(y) = 1 − G¯/y − τ(y) where τ(y) ∈ [0,+∞) for
y ∈ (0,+∞) so that z(y) ≤ 1. Consider also that whenever τ(y) is positively valued,
it is a monotonic continuous function, with either τ ′(y) < 0 (countercyclical) for all
y ∈ (0,+∞) or τ ′(y) > 0 (procyclical) for all y ∈ (0,+∞) or τ ′(y) = 0 (constant) for
all y ∈ (0,+∞). We do not specify second-order conditions for the moment. Of course,
at equilibrium, if τ(y) > 0 we must consider only values for y such that τ(y) ∈ (0, 1),
and more precisely such that z(y) ∈ (0, 1). Note that if τ(y) = 0 for every y, then
z(y) = 1− G¯/y and therefore for y > G¯ we have that z > 0. Let us now consider that
τ(y) 6= 0 and that there is some y > G¯ such that τ(y) < 1− G¯/y. Further let y be such
that τ(y) = 1 − G¯/y¯. Similarly, there exists a y¯ ∈ (y,+∞) such that z(y) > 0 for any
y ∈ (y, y¯). Note that if τ ′(y) < 0 or τ ′(y) = 0 then y¯ = +∞. Since z′(y) = G¯
y2
− τ ′(y),
we conclude that z(y) is strictly increasing if τ ′(y) < 0 or τ ′(y) = 0. In contrast, if
τ ′(y) > 0, then z(y) is single-peaked since z′(y) may change sign only once and that
z(y) takes the value zero at y and y¯.
Rewrite the equation H(y) = H¯ as Q(y) ≡ z(y)α = H¯y1−α. The right-hand side
(RHS) is strictly increasing and concave. Furthermore, for y ∈ (y, y¯), we have that
H¯y1−α ∈ (M, M¯) with M¯ = +∞ if y¯ = +∞. From the left-hand side (LHS), given by
the function Q(y), we derive:
Q(y) = 0
Q(y¯) =
{
< 1 if τ ′(y) < 0 or τ ′(y) = 0
= 0 if τ ′(y) > 0
(43)
Hence, the left-hand side always starts and ends below the right-hand side. It follows
that existence of a steady state implies generically multiplicity. We will have exactly
two steady state if Q(y) is concave. The second-order derivative of Q(y) is such that:
−αz(y)α−1
(1− α)
[
G¯
y2
−τ ′(y)
]2
z(y)
+
[
2G¯
y3
+ τ
′′
(y)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−z′′(y)
 (44)
A suﬃcient condition for concavity is that z(y) is concave, which is the case if and only
if G¯ > −y3τ ′′(y)
2
. This last condition is satisﬁed if the tax function τ(y) is convex or not
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too concave.46
We conclude that for any monotonic continuous function τ(y) ∈ [0,+∞) for y ∈
(0,+∞), with either τ ′(y) < 0 for all y ∈ (0,+∞) , or τ ′(y) > 0 for all y ∈ (0,+∞) , or
τ ′(y) = 0 for all y ∈ (0,+∞), which is convex or not too concave, the equation H(y) =
H¯ has exactly two solutions in y ∈ (y, y¯). Furthermore, diﬀerentiating H(y), one can
show that the lowest solution (i.e. the low output steady state yl) is characterized by
1 + εz(yl) >
1
α
while the high output steady state yh = 1 satisﬁes 1 + εz(yh) <
1
α
. See
(31). As H(y) = H(y¯) = 0 < H¯, we conclude that H(y) is single-peaked.
When G¯ = 0, so that z(y) = 1− τ(y), if τ ′(y) < 0, it is easy to see that the previous
results still apply. However, when τ ′(y) > 0, we have z′(y) < 0, y = 0 and z(0) = 1.
The LHS of the equality Q(y) = H¯y1−α is now strictly decreasing from 1 to 0. As the
RHS strictly increases from 0 to M¯ , these two functions cross only once. Therefore, we
have steady state unicity. Note also that we also have steady state unicity when G¯ = 0
and τ ′(y) = 0. In this case the LHS of the equality Q(y) = H¯y1−α is constant and the
RHS strictly increases from 0 to M¯, so that again these two functions cross only once.
9.3 Public Debt
Here we allow for the existence of a stock of public debt at the time of entry of the
balanced budget rule, D > 0, which obviously remained constant thereafter. This
introduces a new component into government expenditures: interest payments on pub-
lic debt. If D corresponds to perpetual debt, i.e. to ﬁxed-income securities with
interest rates and payments constant overtime, the balanced budget rule becomes
G + g(yt)+r
∗D = (1 − zt)yt, where r∗ is the interest rate that was ﬁxed when the
debt was issued.47 Therefore we have
zt = z(yt) ≡ 1−(G+ r
∗D)
yt
− τ(yt) (45)
46Note that this is only a suﬃcient condition, which means that two steady states may be obtained
even when the degree of concavity of τ(y) is high. For example, for the functional form considered in
Lloyd-Braga et al. (2008), τ(y) = µyφt , we always have two steady states in the presence of any form
of countercyclical tax rates.
47This constitutes a reasonable assumption as a large part of public debt is in the form of medium
and long term ﬁxed-income securities. Moreover this share has been increasing in recent years. For
example Chen et al. (2018) report that the overall weighted average maturity for advanced economies
issuances during 1995 to 2014 was 8.1 years and that for emerging markets and developing economies
was 8.5 years. Furthermore in advanced economies the median short-term debt ratio declined from 22
percent in 1995 to 14 percent in 2011, while in emerging markets and developing economies it peaked
in 1997 at 29 percent, dropping almost continuously to 4 percent in 2013.
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i.e., the consideration of public debt merely increases the size and changes our deﬁnition
of incompressible government expenditures, that now also include ﬁxed interest rate
payments. If public debt is totally held by foreigners, there will be no other changes
in the model and in our results. However, if residents hold public debt, these interest
payments enter the budget constraint of households so that (7) becomes
k˙t + ct = z(yt)[wtlt + rtkt] + r
∗D − δkt. (46)
It is easy to check that at the steady state (23) to (25) still hold and that (26)
becomes
c = z(y)y + r∗D − δk
where z(y) ≡ 1− (G+r∗D)
y
− τ(y). Therefore a steady state satisﬁes the following system
of equations:48
k = sz(y)y
(ρ+δ)
c = [ρ+(1−s)δ]z(y)y
(ρ+δ)
+ r∗D
l = B(1−s)(ρ+δ)z(y)y
[ρ+(1−s)δ]z(y)y+(ρ+δ)r∗D
H(y) = H¯
(47)
with H(y) = (z(y)y)
α+β
y{[ρ+(1−s)δ]z(y)y+(ρ+δ)r∗D}β
H¯ =
(
s
(ρ+δ)
)−α
[B(1− s)(ρ+ δ)]−β
and z(y) ≡ 1− (G+r∗D)
y
− τ(y) > 0
Steady state existence and multiplicity are determined by the solutions of H(y) = H¯.49
To study steady state multiplicity, we must characterize the sign of εH(y) ≡ H′(y)yH(y) .
From (47) we have that
εH(y) = (α + βh(y)) (1 + εz(y))− 1 (48)
where h(y) ≡ r
∗D(ρ+ δ)
[ρ+ (1− s)δ]z(y)y + r∗D(ρ+ δ)
and εz(yt) ≡ z
′(yt)yt
z(yt)
=
(G+ r∗D)− φ(yt)τ(yt)yt
yt − (G+ r∗D)− τ(yt)yt
. (49)
48Note that we restrict y ∈ (y, y¯) with y > 0 and y¯ ∈ (y,+∞) to ensure that z(y) > 0.
49Again we use the scaling parameter B > 0 to ensure the existence of a normalized steady state
(NSS), y = 1.
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Comparing (48) with (31),50 we conclude that now, in contrast with our previous
results, even if εz(y) < 0 for all y ∈ (y, y¯), we can not guarantee the existence of only one
steady. This happens because α+ βh(y) > α, the term that now multiplies (1 + εz(y))
in (48), will be greater than one for some values of y, implying that the function H(y)
may not be always decreasing for all y ∈ (y, y¯) when εz(y) < 0.Moreover, from (49) it is
easy to see that, when D > 0, it is no longer true that εz(y) < 0 for all y ∈ (y, y¯) when
G = 0 and φ(y) ≡ τ ′(y)y/y ≥ 0, so that steady state multiplicity becomes possible
when G = 0 and φ(y) ≡ τ ′(y)y/y ≥ 0. We conclude that the consideration of a positive
stock of public debt held by residents renders the emergence of steady state multiplicity
more likely, which reinforces our global indeterminacy argument.
9.4 Matrix J
J =

(ρ+δ)β(1+εz)
k
y
−α[(1+εz)z− ∂c(k,y)∂y ]
β(1+εz)−1
−(ρ+δ)β+α[δ+ ∂c(k,y)∂k ]
β(1+εz)−1
(1 + εz)z − ∂c(k,y)∂y −(δ + ∂c(k,y)∂k )

9.5 Derivation of the phase diagram
Consider equations (35). The k−nullcline satisﬁes f1(kt, yt) = 0. The implicit solu-
tion k = k1(y) of the above relationship also satisﬁes the following relation (along the
nullcline):
dk1/k1
dy/y
=
[β(1 + εz(y))δk + c(k, y)]
[βδk + α]
> 0 (50)
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that f1(0, y) > 0, f1(+∞, y) < 0. It follows that for a ﬁxed y,
k˙ > 0 for any given k ∈ (0, k1). See ﬁgures 3 and 4 where the we depict the k− nullcline
and the arrows that represent the vector ﬁeld.
The y−nullcline satisﬁes f2(k, y) = 0. Let us ﬁrst show that the relation between
k and y derived from this expression, k = k2(y) , may be multi-valued, i.e. for a ﬁxed
y ∈ (y, y¯), we may have zero, one or two values of k satisfying f2(k, y) = 0. Note that
for a ﬁxed y ∈ (y, y¯), we have f˜2(0) ≡ f2(0, y) < 0 and f˜2(+∞) ≡ f2(+∞, y) < 0, since
c(k, y) is a concave function in k while the last term is linear in k. We also have:
∂f2(k, y)
∂k
=
s2
(1− s)
c(k, y)
k
− [(1− s)ρ+ δ(1− 2s)].
50Remark that when D = 0, so that h(y) = 0, (48) collapses into (31).
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Moreover c(k,y)
k
= (1 − s)Bz(yt)y
β−1
β
t k
α−β
β
t is strictly decreasing in k. Then, for a ﬁxed
y ∈ (y, y¯), there is a critical value k˜(y) such that ∂f2(k,y)
∂k
> (<)0 if k < (>)k˜(y), i.e. the
function f˜2(k) is ﬁrst increasing and them decreasing in k. This implies that, for a given
value of y, f˜2(k) = 0 may have zero, one or two solutions in k satisfying f2(k, y) = 0.
It follows that k2(y) is a two-valued function with an upper (lower) solution satisfying
∂f2(k,y)
∂k
< (> 0). Notice now that, as c
k
evaluated at any steady state is independent of
y, see (28), the sign of this derivative is identical for both steady states and is given by:
s[ρ+ δ(1− s)]− (1− s)[(1− s)ρ+ δ(1− 2s)] (51)
This means that both steady states are either on the upper or the lower solution k2(y).
To simplify the exposition and without loss of generality, we will assume for the rest of
this section that this expression is negative51 which implies that both steady states are
on the upper branch of k2(y).
We can now study the shape of the y−nullcline. We have that:
dk2/k2
dy/y
=
sc(k, y)− β(1 + εz(y))[ρ(1− s) + δ(1− 2s)]k
α
[
sc(k, y)− (1−s)
s
[ρ(1− s) + δ(1− 2s)]k
] (52)
=
s2z(y)y − [β(1 + εz(y))− 1][ρ(1− s) + δ(1− 2s)]k
α
{
s2z(y)y − (1−2s)
s
[ρ(1− s) + δ(1− 2s)]k
}
It is easy to see that for k = 0, i.e., at the intersection between the y−nullcline and the
horizontal axis, the slope of the y−nullcline is equal to 1
α
> 1. Also, from (52), we can
see that the slope of the y−nullcline will change sign at most two times and that the
numerator is positive on the right-hand side of the singularity point ys. Furthermore,
when evaluated at a steady state, the slope of the nullcline is given by:
[s [ρ+ δ(1− s)]− (1− s) [(1− s)ρ+ δ(1− 2s)]α(1 + εz(yj))]
α [s [ρ+ δ(1− s)]− (1− s) [(1− s)ρ+ δ(1− 2s)]] , j = h, l (53)
where by assumption the denominator is negative, see (51), so that the two steady states
are located on the upper branch of the nullcline. Therefore, when the NSS is a saddle,
i.e. located at the RHS of ys, the slope of the y−nullcline is negative. This implies that
the y−nullcline admits a maximum at a point y∗ < ys, as it must change sign before the
singularity. We still need to characterize the slope around the lower steady state and
around the upper steady state when it is a sink. Around the lower (upper) steady state,
we have (1 + εz(yl)) > (<)
1
α
. Since by assumption s[ρ+δ(1−s]
(1−s)[(1−s)ρ+δ(1−2s)] < 1, it follows
that dk
dy
> 0 around the lower steady state. In contrast, the sign of the numerator is left
undetermined for the upper steady state when it is a sink i.e. it can be located on the
51For a standard parameterization (ρ, δ) = (0.01, 0.025), this is satisﬁed fo any s ∈ (0, 0.39).
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increasing or decreasing part of the upper-solution of k2(y). Obviously, on the lower
branch of the y-nullcline, the derivative has an opposite sign. As a result, the y-nullcline
is ﬁrst increasing in y and then decreases until s
2
(1−s)c(k, y) = (1− s)ρ+ δ(1− 2s)]k. It
bends therefore backwards and goes back to the origin (without attaining it).
We now determine the directions of the arrows that represent the vector ﬁeld of
y˙t. Remember that our model exhibits a singularity when g(y
s) = β(1+εz(y
s))−1 = 0,
which in the space (y, k), deﬁnes a vertical line y = ys. Of course, on diﬀerent sides of
the vertical line y = ys horizontal arrows point in opposite directions. Now consider a
point (y1, k1) on the LHS of ys and above the y− nullcline. As we know that ∂f2(k,y)∂k =
(1+γ) {s3z(y)y − [ρ(1− s) + δ(1− 2s)](1− 2s)k} we know that moving from y1 on the
zero motion line, i.e. on f2(y1, k) = 0, vertically to (y1, k1), f2(y, k) is decreasing. Hence
y˙ > 0 at (y1, k1), changing sign whenever, for the same k1, we cross the y−nullcline
or the y = ys line. The same reasoning applies to any ﬁxed k on the LHS of ys and
above the y−nullcline. It follows that for any k on the LHS of ys but below the the y−
nullcline f2(y, k) is decreasing, i.e., y˙ < 0, changing again sign whenever, for the same
k, we cross the y−nullcline or the y = ys line. See ﬁgures 3 and 4.
It is also easy to show that when k = 0 the y−nullcline is located on the right
of the k−nullcline as depicted in ﬁgures 3 and 4. Indeed, although limk→0 c(k, y) =
0, it is easy to see that k will tend to zero faster than C(k, y). Therefore, rewriting
f1(kt, yt) = 0 and f2(kt, yt) = 0 respectively as:
z(yt)yt = c(kt, yt) + δkt
z(yt)yt =
c(kt, yt)
s
− [ρ(1− s) + δ(1− 2s)]k(t)
s2
when k → 0, on the k˙ = 0 nullcline we have that z(y)y = limk→0 c(k, y), while on
the y˙ = 0 nullcline z(y)y = limk→0
c(k,y)
s
> limk→0 c(k, y). As z(y)y is an increasing
function of y, on the horizontal axis, the y−nullcline starts on the right hand side of
the k−nullcline.
9.6 Obtaining the stable manifolds in the Markov switching ra-
tional expectation equilibrium with two saddles
We ﬁrst assume p and q arbitrarily small (i.e. p = q = 0). Then, using the reverse
shooting method, we obtain two numerical solution paths for our deterministic non
linear dynamic system, converging respectively to the high and the low output steady
states. We then apply non linear polynomial ﬁtting procedures to obtain the two stable
arms yj(kt) for j = h, l.
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We are now ready to simulate our regime switching economy. Indeed, for a given
capital, observed output is obtained by randomizing across both stable-arms using the
sunspot variables St:
yt(kt, St) = Sty
h(kt) + (1− St)yl(kt) (54)
where St = (1 − p)St−1 + q(1 − St−1). The realization of observed output in turn
determines which saddle-path we are in. Hence, substituting yt(kt, St) in (40) the next
equilibrium value of the capital stock conditional on the sunspot, kt+1(St) is determined.
From there, we compute the next values of both yht+1(kt+1) and y
l
t+1(kt+1) and given a
realization of St+1, obtain a new observed output yt+1(kt+1, St+1) and so on.
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